Abstract
This chapter presents empirical evidence resulted from the application of Hypothetical Monopoly Test—SSNIP to the Brazilian market of readymade meals by the Department of Economic Studies of the Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE). The firm-level data was taken, and the SSNIP test was applied to analyze if the relevant market of the merging companies—JBS/Seara and Massa Leve limited to products of the standard category, while products of the main agent of the market—BRF/Sadia—would be in a different niche or category called premium. It was observed that the hypothesis of a separated market for standard and premium readymade meals is practically null. The proposed merger between JBS/Seara and Massa Leve might create a stronger competitor to diminish the dominance of the market by BRF/Sadia. The operation was approved with no restrictions by CADE in 2014 and has marked a period of increased use of new economic methodologies in CADES's decision. This chapter also describes the history of the establishment of a specific Department of Economics in CADE's new structure.
JEL codes
- F12: Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies • Fragmentation
- F16: Trade and Labor Market Interactions
- J31: Wage Level and Structure • Wage Differentials
Reference
Simone Cuiabano, Luiz Alberto Esteves, and Dimas Mateus Fazio, “Application of Hypothetical Monopoly Test (SSNIP) to the Brazilian Market of Ready-Made Meals and the Role of the Department of Economic Studies”, in Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries, Frédéric Jenny, and Yannis Katsoulacos (eds.), Springer, June 2016, pp. 349–361.
See also
Published in
Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries, Frédéric Jenny, and Yannis Katsoulacos (eds.), Springer, June 2016, pp. 349–361