Abstract
This paper extends reputational cheap-talk model to study the effect of competition in the media on quality of news. We find that competition helps sustaining informative reporting when it covers is-sues on which the follow-up quality assessment is likely to be possible, such as various forecasts. However, it increases the elasticity of demand and thereby creates the incentives to confirm the common priors on controversial issues, such as politics.
Keywords
quality of news; competition; reputational cheap-talk;
JEL codes
- L82: Entertainment • Media
- L10: General
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Reference
Elena Panova, “Competition in the media market and confirmatory news”, TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1597, November 2024.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1597, November 2024