Abstract
This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis. Returns-to-scale and the intensity of competition are key to understanding the impact of vertical integration or separation between infrastructure and operation services within each country in the presence of international transport services. We also consider an option in which a transnational infrastructure manager is in charge of offering a coordinated access to the national networks. In our model, it turns out to be an optimal industry structure.
JEL codes
- L14: Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks
- L42: Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts
- L51: Economics of Regulation
- L92: Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
Reference
Guido Friebel, Marc Ivaldi, and Jérôme Pouyet, “Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation”, IDEI Working Paper, n. 680, July 18, 2011, revised June 7, 2012.
See also
Published in
IDEI Working Paper, n. 680, July 18, 2011, revised June 7, 2012