Abstract
Cross-subsidization arises naturally when firms with different comparative ad- vantages compete for consumers with diverse shopping patterns. Firms then face a form of co-opetition, being substitutes for one-stop shoppers and complements for multi-stop shoppers. Competition for one-stop shoppers then drives total prices down to cost, but firms subsidize weak products with the profit made on strong products. While firms and consumers would benefit from cooperation limiting cross- subsidization (e.g., through price caps), banning below-cost pricing instead increases firms’ profits at the expense of one-stop shoppers; this calls for a cautious use of below-cost pricing regulations in competitive markets.
Keywords
cross-subsidization; shopping patterns; multiproduct competition; co-opetition;
JEL codes
- L11: Production, Pricing, and Market Structure • Size Distribution of Firms
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Replaced by
Zhijun Chen, and Patrick Rey, “Competitive Cross-Subsidization”, The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 50, n. 3, 2019, pp. 645–665.
Reference
Zhijun Chen, and Patrick Rey, “Competitive Cross-Subsidization”, TSE Working Paper, n. 13-450, December 14, 2013, revised November 2018.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 13-450, December 14, 2013, revised November 2018