Working paper

Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships

Volker Nocke, and Patrick Rey

Abstract

We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream manufacturers that produce differentiated goods and downstream retailers that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, at the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.

Keywords

vertical relations; exclusive dealing; vertical merger; foreclosure; bilateral contracting;

JEL codes

  • D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L42: Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts

Replaced by

Volker Nocke, and Patrick Rey, “Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 177, September 2018, pp. 183–221.

Reference

Volker Nocke, and Patrick Rey, “Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships”, TSE Working Paper, n. 14-515, July 2014, revised June 2018.

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 14-515, July 2014, revised June 2018