Mediated Renegotiation

Abstract

We develop a new approach to contract renegotiation under informational frictions. Specically, we consider mediated mechanisms which cannot be contingent on any subsequent offer, but can generate a new source of asymmetric information between the contracting parties. Taking as a reference the canonical framework of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), we show that, if mediated mechanisms are allowed, the corresponding renegotiation game admits only one equilibrium allocation, which coincides with the second-best one. Thus, the inefficiencies typically associated to the threat of renegotiation may be completely offset by the design of more sophisticated trading mechanisms.

JEL codes

Reference

Andrea Attar, Lorenzo Bozzoli, and Roland Strausz, “Mediated Renegotiation”, TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1522, March 2024.