Abstract
The killer acquisitions theory states that established firms buy new businesses to pre-empt future competition, particularly in the pharmaceutical and digital industries. The theory fuels demand to make merger policy more restrictive. • But is the theory of killer acquisitions supported by empirical facts? • Focusing on past investigations by the European Commission in information technology industries, this article studies whether acquisitions by large technology companies reduce competition by eliminating future rivalry. • Despite the small sample size, the findings suggest that none of the reviewed transaction was followed by the disappearance of the target’s products, a weakening of competing firms, and/or a post-merger lowering or absence of entry and innovation.
Keywords
killer acquisitions, case study, dynamic competition, innovation, mergers and acquisitions, nascent competitors;
JEL codes
- G34: Mergers • Acquisitions • Restructuring • Corporate Governance
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software
- O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Replaces
Marc Ivaldi, Nicolas Petit, and Selçukhan Unekbas, “Killer Acquisitions: Evidence from EC Merger Cases in Digital Industries”, TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1420, March 2023, revised October 2024.
Reference
Marc Ivaldi, Nicolas Petit, and Selçukhan Unekbas, “Killer Acquisitions: Evidence from European Merger Cases”, Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 86-2, 2024, forthcoming.
See also
Published in
Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 86-2, 2024, forthcoming